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Abstract
This paper provides a conceptual framework for analysing trust and power in the internal
relationships of the organization. It adopts a neo-institutionalist view focussing on the structural
inventory and the social embeddedness of the organization in the process of developing trust
between its individual members. It is suggested that, based on specific combinations of factors
rooted in the internal social structure as well as the external socio-economic environment of the
organization, two divergent trust/power control patterns emerge as ideal-typical forms of co-
ordinating expectations and interaction among organizational actors.2
1 Introduction
The problem of co-ordinating individual actors’ activities within the boundaries of the
organization is certainly one of the key issues of organizational theory. Irrespective of
whether the nature of the organization is seen as primarily based on contractual
arrangements, shared social norms, constellations of economic interests or common
cultural orientations, the question of how to integrate different actors’ expectations and
interaction lies at the heart of any organization’s identity. If this function is not fulfilled
satisfactorily, organizations will be confronted with serious problems which make it
unlikely that they will survive over a longer period of time. However, the simple fact that
stable organizations  exist, and even more so, that many of them are quite successful
with their activities, can be taken as a strong indication that this co-ordination problem
can be tackled and in fact  effectively solved every day all around the globe.
Undoubtedly, organizations can also look chaotic and indeed may collapse where too
many divergent interests render these uncontrollable. But it is an indisputable and - in a
theoretical perspective - more remarkable observation that in countless cases complex
organizations exist in a stable manner, operate profitably, develop their businesses, and
even survive when their strategies need to be radically redefined where far-reaching
changes in the business environment forces them to do so (Luhmann 1984).
In this paper, it will be argued that a fruitful approach to understanding the co-
ordination of expectations and interaction within organizations, builds on the insight that
there must be certain social mechanisms at work which allow for a swift and relatively
frictionless alignment of its individual members’ behaviour. It will be suggested that trust
and power are efficient means to do this job. This paper will show how these mechanisms
function, what are the preconditions and consequences of employing them, and how they
can be inter-linked and thus provide specific regimes of organizational control. Section 2
of this contribution will deal with the nature and various forms of trust as well as with the
role of power in organizational relations, while section 3 will discuss two different types3
of organizational regulation building on the specific sort and combination of trust and
power that occurs in organizational relationships. The conclusion will be a short
summing-up of the argument presented in this chapter.
2  Trust
2.1 The nature of organizational trust
As a theoretical starting point, the social mechanism of trust may be conceptualized as
being based on a decision by which one social actor selects a  	
 assumption
among a large number of other - in principle equally  - assumptions about the
future behaviour of another social actor (Luhmann 1979). The proactive party, i.e. the
trustor, makes this selection, communicates it to the trustee and builds his own behaviour
onto this assumption. He signals that he is prepared to make decisions generous and
favourable to a trustee under the condition of limited knowledge of 
	 motives
and abilities as well as the impersonal circumstances in which this individual will behave
in the future (Nooteboom 2002a). In doing so, he makes a pre-commitment assuming that
the other party will not behave opportunistically. Although far from having any
guarantees, a trustor chooses to assume that the trustee will simply not take advantage of
his vulnerability resulting from his one-sided pre-commitment, and ignores the rest of
other possibilities.
Such a pre-commitment need not necessarily be solely interpreted with regard to
its normative implications. Often such a behaviour is eminently important to simply
provide a first step to initiate any form of social interaction between two actors
(Bachmann 2001). Where none of the parties finds itself able to offer a one-sided
commitment in advance, it may well be that no social communication at all will arise
between them. Where one actor, however, makes this first step, the second actor will also
be able select specific assumptions with regard to the first actor’s future behaviour and4
discard the rest of other possibilities. Thus, specificexpectations can be selected on a
	
 basis, a large number of theoretically equally expectable possibilities of 

actor’s future behaviour are rejected, and long chains of co-ordinated social interaction,
i.e. complex social systems, can emerge. Trust, in other words, facilitates the co-
ordination of expectations and allows for meaningful complex interaction between
individuals who might otherwise have little chance to engage in any kind of social
relationship.
Unlike other mechanisms of co-ordinating expectations and interaction between
two social actors, trust unavoidably requires an extrapolation from the available
information on part of the initiative individual, i.e. the trustor. As he has no guarantees as
regards the future behaviour of the trustee he will necessarily have to bear a certain
amount of risk as soon as he decides to invest trust in a social relationship. On the one
hand, an actor’s decision to offer trust as the prime co-ordination mechanism within a
relationship diffuses uncertainty that would otherwise characterise the situation and
paralyse the two potential interactors. But, on the other hand, it also produces a 

coded risk: the trust investment will 	 pay off  the trustee will misuse the trustor’s
pre-commitment and not reciprocate any favours.
Given this inherent characteristic of trust, it seems evident that social actors who
consider this mechanism as a possible basis for their interaction with another actor
usually seek reasons as to why the risk of trust will at least not exceed certain - more or
less acceptable - limits. Although trust can never be built on complete information - since
it would make itself superfluous in this case - sensible trustors are, by the same token, not
keen to invest ‘blind trust’. The latter is not likely to win any social admiration
(especially not if it fails). Potential trustors usually try to roughly assess the risk that they
would buy into with their decision to invest trust in a relationship and then decide
whether or not they are prepared to bear this risk. Social actors, thus, tend to make limited
investments of trust. They may, in their everyday routines, be far from basing their
decisions always on explicit and quantifiable calculation but, at the same time, it would5
be unrealistic to assume that there are many cases where they have  no consciousness of
the consequences of their behaviour at all.
If this is so, then one of the most crucial subsequent questions is: what can
provide 
 (Bachmann 2001) for a (potential) trustor to believe that the risk he
needs to accept when making a trust investment in the form of a pre-commitment will not
exceed a certain limit of acceptability? Following Luhmann’s argument (1979), the
existence or absence of legal norms may be seen as playing a central role in many
situations where trust is considered as the dominant co-ordination mechanism in a social
relationship. In an environment where clear and reliable legal norms exist, a potential
trustor has  
 to assume that the potential trustee, who also knows these
norms, will generally be discouraged from cheating. It is presupposed, however, that the
sanctions connected with these legal norms remain latent. In other words, trust requires
that these sanctions are not considered explicitly by the trustee and that the potential
trustor does not refer to them with the intention of threatening the potential trustee. The
mobilisation of sanctions is seen as playing a role only in exceptional cases which neither
the trustor nor the trustee expects to become reality. Normally, it seems sufficient if social
actors orient their behaviour 
	 the existing legal arrangements. If social
actors simply accept these without too much critical reflection on worst case scenarios,
legal norms do a perfect job. Under these - and only under these! - conditions legal norms
can be seen as an important pre-requisite to foster the production of trust in social
relationships.
Applying this conceptualization of the trust mechanism to the world of social
relations within organizations sheds light on the function of 
 rules that are
incorporated in the structure of the organization rather than on 
 norms that may exist
in the institutional environment of the organization. These intra-organizational social
rules are represented, for example, in the patterns of division of work and the distribution
of responsibilities, the agreements on work duties of each individual member of the6
organization etc. Also, they include forms of conflict resolution (Wittek 2002) and
various other arrangements and practices that may evolve within the boundaries of the
organization. All of these are elements of what could be called the 		

	of
the organization. Similar to how extra-organizational legal norms do their job with regard
to individuals’ behaviour, these intra-organizational social rules constitute the internal
structural framework of the organization which channels each individual’s behaviour
according to the identity and dynamics of the organization as a whole. In that these rules
have a normative dimension, they imply the 		
 for sanctions which may be used
against individual actors who do not comply. Under usual circumstances, however, these
sanctions - similar to legal norms existing in the external environment of the organization
- are not activated. Their 		
 to sanction individuals’ (mis-)behaviour is strong
enough to direct individuals’ decisions effectively towards certain channels of acceptable
behaviour. Explicit threats with sanctions usually seem unnecessary. Where this happens,
it constitutes an exceptional situation; if it occurs repeatedly, it may eventually result in a
severe crisis, making a fundamental restructuring of the organization’s institutional
inventory likely and sometimes unavoidable.
The central function of the rules implied in the structural inventory of the
organization is to provide 
 social and cultural meaning as well as a common set of
interpretation categories as regards economic and technical knowledge. This produces a
 which - with regard to building trust - plays an eminently important
role in organizations. Where the structural inventory of an organization is stable and
reliable, their individual members are more likely to find 
 to believe that the
risk of investing trust in their relationships with other actors of the same organization is
relatively low. The way a potential trustee will behave in the future is simply easier to
predict under these circumstances than it is where such a ‘world-in-common’ is not in
place. A strong internal regulation of the organization, in other words, will reduce the
inherent risk of trust considerably. Where the structural inventory of the organization is
fuzzy and unreliable it is likely that individual actors will be less inclined to invest trust7
in their relationships to each other. It simply seems hazardous to invest trust where no or
few shared orientations exist and the future behaviour of a colleague, a supervisor or a
subordinate worker is difficult to foresee.
This theoretical approach to understanding trust in intra-organizational relations,
which has been developed in the present contribution so far, draws substantively on
Luhmann’s systems theoretical reflections (1979). It also is inspired by conceptual
notions developed within the framework of New Institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio
1991; Scott 1995). At least the following three basic features of the phenomenon of trust
are agreed by both of these theoretical traditions:
- Trust deals with the problem of predicting another social actor’s future
behaviour. It is - to use Simmel’s words - a state of mind, somewhere between
knowing and not knowing (Simmel 1950) what a potential trustee will do in the
future. It is a specific characteristic of trust that it provides a way of bridging this
gap by accepting risk.
- It is legitimate and most likely that a potential trustor will seek possibilities to
reduce the risk he needs to bear when investing trust. The risk cannot be
calculated in exact terms but there must exist 
 to assume that the
inherent risk of trust will not exceed certain limits. Otherwise, trust is not
justified and will usually not occur.
- Apart from the potential trustees’ goodwill and abilities to perform according to
the potential trustor’s expectations, the institutional framework in which the
possible relationship between the two parties will be embedded (Granovettor
1985) is very important with regard to whether the trustor will decide to invest
trust or to refrain from doing so.8
2.2  Different forms of trust
The  		
 literature on trust makes an important distinction between two
fundamental forms of trust: personal trust and impersonal trust. While an everyday
understanding of trust tends to see it as a phenomenon that emerges in an intimate
relationship between two individuals, many scholars emphasize the role of impersonal
trust, particularly in the field of organizational relations. One of the central problems with
the latter form of trust, however, seems to be that there exist divergent notions as to
whether this concept should refer to the 	 of trust or to the
	 in which
individuals’ social relationships are embedded. In the first case, the understanding is that
individuals trust  systems of cultural or institutional rules. In the latter case, individuals
are assumed to trust each other 	
 the structural arrangements surrounding
them. Clearly, these two concepts differ significantly and, thus, at least 	 forms of
trust might be worth discerning:
- personal trust (based on experiences individuals make with each other in the
course of frequent interaction over a longer period of time)
- system trust (trust an individual has  the functioning and in the reliability of
impersonal social structures)
- institutional trust (trust between individuals 


 existing impersonal social
rules)
The concept of 
		comes closest to the ordinary language connotations of
trust. It can be fostered by frequently using opportunities to have face-to-face contacts
between individual actors. The usual proximity of workplaces within organizations can be
seen as a seedbed for developing this form of trust. It is often much more difficult to
establish it in the organization’s external relationships where personal contacts are often
much rarer. But even within organizations the problem with this form of trust is that it9
takes a lot of time to grow. Also, in many cases it is as such not sufficient to effectively
co-ordinate expectations and interaction between individuals, especially not in large and
complex organizations. Nonetheless, it is a form of trust which is and remains important
in social relationships. There seems to be strong indication that this form of trust, with the
decline of the bureaucratic organization model, has gained renewed importance in many
social relationships within organizational contexts (Ebers 1997; Lane and Bachmann
1998).
			is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in anthropological conditions
of human behaviour. While individuals unavoidably must have  - as Luhmann
(1988) proposes to say here - in certain rules (e.g. natural laws) and authorities (e.g.
parents, from a child’s perspective), this form of trust has also become increasingly
important today for a number of man-made, i.e. 	
and
, artifacts which in
modern times take on a character quite similar to those which can be viewed as the really
unalterable  	 

. With reference to this observation, Giddens (1990)
argues that modern societies constitutively depend on lay individuals’ preparedness to
have trust in ‘abstract systems’ operated by highly specialised experts. Trust in the safety
technology and procedures in the commercial aviation industry - to mention an example
used by Giddens (1990, p. 85) himself - is simply a precondition for many people’s need
to swiftly travel long distances today. Although very few passengers have any idea about
 flying on airplanes can be considered one of the safest ways to travel, they - even
after having seen the horror scenes of hijacked planes crashing into New York’s World
Trade Center - do trust in the aviation safety systems and the experts who develop and
operate them, just like they trust religious leaders and the law of gravity, or like little
children unquestioningly trust their parents.
In similar vein, 	 		 that exists within organizations builds on the
authority attributed to formal social positions as well as on the reliability of technical
systems, standards and procedures. For example, employees of an organization that
operates within a strongly hierarchy-based business environment may have the strongest10
belief that their employer will always make decisions which are to their benefit.
Similarly, the workers at an atomic plant may have the infallible believe that the
technology they are dealing with simply cannot fail because generations of experts have
made the greatest efforts to prevent any possibility of failure. The latter example
illustrates particularly well that the object of 	 		 is usually a large abstract
system which primarily exists at the societal level reaching into the organizational world
from its 	
 environment (Bachmann 2000).
One of the most interesting phenomena associated with this form of trust is that
once in a while some representatives of the systemic abstract authorities whose activities
are, in normal circumstances, largely withdrawn from their clients’, customers’ or
workforce’s awareness, become touchable. The purpose of this is to reassure these
individuals that their trust is targeted to responsible social actors who are actually in
control of the systems they stand for. This is why pilots occasionally speak to their
passengers, eloquent nuclear scientists appear in TV talk shows and powerful
entrepreneurs as well as high ranking managers of large corporations suddenly become
equal to the lowest paid cleaner in their organization when sitting next to him at the
occasion of a Christmas party. In all these situations individuals lend a personal flavour to
the unknown abstract worlds of superior knowledge and power confirming that these
deserve to be trusted. Without these boundary-spanning roles being competently
performed at suitable occasions, it would be doubtful that these abstract authoritative and
technical systems can - at least in the longer run - be a powerful source of trust.
			
		 is rooted in a transfer of an organization’s control capacity
from the level of individual to the level of collective decision. This form of trust emerges
where one social actor offers a pre-commitment to another actor 

  pecific
institutional arrangements that constitute a world of shared meaning and normative rules
of behaviour within organizations. This form of trust - as described in section 2.1 of this
chapter - draws on the institutionalised patterns of the division of work duties and
responsibilities as well as other elements of the structural inventory of the organization to11
which individual actors inevitably have to orient their expectations when interacting with
one another. Although the rules that are incorporated in the structural arrangements of the
organization may privilege some individuals while they restrict others in their chances to
influence collectively binding decisions, they appear as a de-personalised and legitimised
institutional order. Thus, they have normative power over expectations and interaction
between the individual members of the organization, largely irrespective of their
situational interests and the resources they might be able to mobilise in order to promote
their particularistic interests. Because institutions are blind to individuals’ opportunistic
interests and the temporary availability of individually attributable resources of power,
they can provide an important basis for the constitution of trust within organizations.
The structural inventory of the organization seems to be particularly relevant with
regard to the amount of trust that it can swiftly produce among its members. If there exist
powerful institutional rules to control the behaviour of individuals within organizations,
these can absorb risk and increase the chance that trust becomes a preferred mechanism to
co-ordinate social actors’ expectations and interaction. Trust based on organizational
institutions is in principle a home-bred phenomenon, constitutively produced 	 the
boundaries of the organization. It can thus vary greatly from organization to organization.
In contrast, 	 		 is mostly a phenomenon which originates in the 	

environment from where it reaches into the internal world of the organization.
As mentioned above, the characteristics of the national or regional business
system in which an organization operates has a strong impact on the quality of intra-
organizational relations (Whitley 1999; Sorge 1996; Streeck 1997). Thus, it can
significantly foster the development of 			 relevant for the organiztion’s internal
activities (Bachmann 2002). At the same time, it can be assumed that this external
environment also has a strong impact on the conditions under which 			
 		 is
generated within the organization. In highly regulated territorial business systems,
organizations are likely to adapt their internal structures to the business environment in so12
far as they place specific emphasis on generalised rules and standardised procedures to
attain their organizational goals and to realise their strategies. In reverse, situational
decision-making in which the idiosyncrasies of individuals become influential are
generally more likely to occur in organizations which operate in national and regional
business systems that are characterised by a weak form of structural regulation and a low
level of trust (Fox 1974; Bachmann 2001).
2.3 Power in organizations
Without doubt, trust is a 
 
	
 (Bourdieu 1979; Coleman 1990) which can
become very valuable with regard to an organization’s strategic competitiveness. It can
considerably contribute to saving on transaction costs, speed up business processes and
produce a work atmosphere which can be conducive to the innovativeness and
creativeness of the organization’s management and workforce. Thus, when compared to
other means of fulfilling the same function, e.g. power or money, trust can be deemed a
highly attractive mechanism to co-ordinate social relationships (Bradach and Eccles
1989). However, it cannot be ignored that there are also disadvantages to over-reliance on
this co-ordination mechanism. 
		, in particular, is fragile and can break down
without any chance of being quickly restored. In similar vein, it cannot be excluded that  -
under certain conditions - 			
		 fades away where organizations go through
periods of severe crisis (Kern 1998). Even 			 may turn out not to be completely
safe against erosion as could be illustrated with reference to large-scale technological
disasters such as Chernobyl or the gradual decline of the charismatic leadership model in
the past three decades or so.
Looking at these problems that can occur with trust, it is worth considering other
mechanisms which might also be utilised for the co-ordination of internal activities of the
organization. For example, power can be assumed to be a mechanism which - as counter-
intuitive as it may seem - works on the basis of principles quite similar to those involved13
when trust is present. At the heart of both of these mechanisms lies a process in which
one social actor 	 specific assumptions about the future behaviour of another actor.
In this respect, there is no difference between a trusting actor and a powerful actor. Each
of them makes such a selection knowing that other choices are equally possible. Similar
to a trustee, a (potentially) power accepting actor is - at least in principle - free to choose
whether or not he will behave according to what the powerful party sees as a preferable
way of dealing with each other in the future. However, the powerful actor does not select
a positive assumption about the other party’s future behaviour, as a trustor does. Rather,
he selects a negative possibility of how the (potentially) power accepting actor could
behave and presents it to him as a choice that would not be in either party’s interest and
hence as a possibility that should be avoided. From an analytical point of view, the result
is not altogether different from what trust can achieve in a social relationship. Each of the
two mechanisms can provide an effective solution to the problem of co-ordinating social
actors’ activities.
Also, as in the case of a trust-based relationship, any calculation that the
(potentially) power exerting and accepting actors may be inclined to make must
necessarily remain incomplete and imprecise. If the sanctions connected to the negative
hypothetical assumption that the powerful actor has selected with regard to the power
accepting actor’s behaviour need to be mobilized, he has already lost his power and the
quality of the relationship - if it does not simply end at this stage - takes on the form of
coercion or violence (Clegg 1989). In the case of this event, power collapses similar to
the breakdown of trust when legal and/or explicit sanctions are activated against cheaters.
The similarities between the two mechanisms of co-ordinating expectations and
interaction of organizational actors are, thus, quite striking. This, however, is not to say
that there are no differences at all (Luhmann 1979).
The decision to use power as the preferred means of co-ordinating expectations
and interaction between social actors in an organizational context buys into risk just as
the decision to trust would do. But power does - at least in normal circumstances - not14
have the same 
 weight that trust has. Power is, in this respect, generally more robust
and one can expect that if power breaks down, this does usually not imply the same
disastrous effects on inter-personal relationships and/or the organizational climate, as the
disappointment of trust is likely to produce. This can be seen as an important advantage
of power and one may conclude that power thus suggests itself as the preferable option
for co-ordinating social actors’ expectations and interaction in many situations,
particularly where trust, from a potential trustor’s point of view, appears too risky. In this
case, a potential trustor might well prefer using his resources of power, pre-supposing - of
course - that he has (a sufficient quantity of) these available. They can have the form of
social reputation, privileged access to specific knowledge, superior communication skills
etc. Whenever a (potential) trustor finds that he might foster his interests with less effort,
faster and/or with less risk if he decides to draw on his resources of power, one should
assume that he will in fact take this option disregarding the positive effects that a trust-
based relationship might yield. The question of whether trust or power appears as the
preferable option to the proactive party of the relationship might also depend on the
psychological disposition of the individual actors and the existing and/or expected
dynamics in an ongoing relationship (Nooteboom 2002b). By and large, however, this
prediction should hold true if there are no exceptional extra- or intra-organizational
factors which might additionally influence social actors’ decisions.
To conclude, on the one hand, trust can be betrayed and - if this happens - the
relationship between two individuals is likely to be destroyed for a long period of time.
On the other hand, power can also be challenged. If this occurs it is likely that open
conflict will be the result which may do considerable harm not only to the specific
relationship between two individual actors but also to the organization as a whole. In
usual circumstances, the advantages of a relationship that is predominantly based on trust
are likely to supercede the possible advantages of a power-based relationship. Trust is a
highly effective lubricant in many relationships which may increase with using it
(Hirschman 1984). Power, by way of contrast, has generally a lower value as social15
capital and can hardly produce any self-controlled dynamics. There are, however,
numerous cases where a powerful (potential) trustor has 
 to consider power
as his first choice. It may minimise risk more effectively and facilitate the alignment of
other views with his own ideas in a more efficient manner.
3     Two different trust/power control patterns
In practice, the distinction between trust and power is a lot less sharp than it may seem at
the analytical level. In fact, social relationships within (and between) organizations are
normally based on a combination of both of these mechanisms. The empirically
interesting question is often simply whether trust or power is dominant over the other




	 between which an individual actor can choose provided that both
mechanisms are available to him at all. The latter, of course, is not always the case.
Where, for example, a subordinate actor has no or little resources of power to draw on,
the choice between trust and power is virtually non-existent for him. In such a situation
this actor may hope that the powerful party will offer trust to be used as the central co-
ordination mechanism in the relationship. But, evidently, it will be the powerful actor
who will have the choice between running the risk that his pre-commitment may be
misused by the potential trustee and relying on the assumption that the potentially power
accepting party will actually take the fact that he has significant resources of power
available as a 
 to acknowledge his claim. Thus, it largely depends on social
status and situational circumstances whether or not a social actor will have a serious
choice. Of course, theoretically one can assume that a powerless actor is always free to
refuse acceptance of the powerful actor’s selection of negative possibilities as regards his
future behaviour and to favour, instead, an option which has been presented to him as one
which should be avoided. But this has little relevance for the empirical world. Both
parties are simply not equal in their chances of deciding which co-ordination mechanism16
should be dominant in the relationship. Rather, it seems that it is invariably the powerful
party that ultimately determines which specific mixture of trust and power will dominate
the relationship. There are, of course, cases where each of the two parties can draw on
significant resources of power which they may use against each other. But then, this
mechanism dramatically decreases its effectiveness as a means of co-ordinating
expectations and interaction within the organization. The possibilities of developing trust
in relationships increase accordingly under these circumstances.
Where trust and power appear as more or less distinct options, it is likely that

		 is the form of trust that is in debate. By contrast, in cases of 			
and 			
		, it is hardly a question of individual choice whether trust or power
should have more weight in a relationship. The latter observation, of course, raises the
question then: what other kind of inter-relationship between these two mechanisms could
also be considered as possible? The answer as such is simple: impersonal trust - in the
form of 			 or 			
		 - and impersonal power can each appear as a
precondition of the impact of the other mechanism on individual actors’ behaviour. The
underlying assumptions and the theoretical consequences of this notion, however, are a
bit more challenging to unravel.
As has been explained above, internal institutions and structural arrangements in
the environment of the organization can be deemed a prime source of trust at the level of
inter-personal relationships. Largely irrespective of the situational circumstances,
potential trustors will often find enough  
 to assume that the risk of
misplaced trust is low where the 		

	 and the 			
	
of the organization are stable and reliable. Under these conditions, trust is
predominantly produced in a de-personalised manner and will thus mostly appear in the
form of impersonal trust, i.e. as 			
		 and/or 			. If this is the case, it
can be assumed that the level of trust will generally be high within the organization. For a
potential trustor, it would simply seem not sensible to believe that a potential trustee is
very likely to behave in an unforeseen manner unless there are exceptional circumstances17
to be considered, which recommend special precaution. A potential trustee can simply be
trusted with less risk when he acts within ‘social structures in which it is in … (his)
interest to be behave trustworthily’ (Coleman 1990, p. 111).
Such structures which bundle social actors’ interaction along the lines of
generally accepted behaviour can be interpreted as with regard to relationships
within organizations. Power in this sense is, of course, different from the form of power
that is based on the resources an actor can individually draw on. This form of power is
incorporated in the institutional inventory of the organization and/or the structures of the
authoritative and expert discourses that reach into the organization from its external
environment. This impersonal form of power can be seen as a 	 of the
existence and development of 			
		 and 			 within the organization.
In the face of 			
 and/or 	 - to use a terminology that closely
connects with the distinctions made above with regard to trust (section 2) - individual
actors tend to recognize 
 to assume that the risk of misplaced trust is low
and that investing trust in their relationships with each other is preferable to relying on
individual resources of power (always provided that this is a realistic option for one of
them at all).
The latter marks a fundamental difference between strongly and weakly regulated
organizations. Where 			
 and/or 	 foster the development of
impersonal trust between members of an organization, a generally high level of trust is
likely to prevail in their relationships. If, in contrast, a low level of organizational
regulation exists, individual actors have a choice between either putting more effort into
developing trust at the inter-personal level or - which indeed is more likely to happen
then - falling back on their individual resources of power. The development of 

		 - although often considered as in principle preferable - would often simply seem too
costly in terms of time and effort to be made (Zucker 1986).
Within organizational contexts where highly generalised and powerful rules exist,
individuals may find it relatively easy to develop trust (			 and 			
18
		) in their relationships while, paradoxically, the need for trust seems relatively low.
Where a high level of impersonal trust is present social actors have fewer incentives to
develop  
 		 in their relationships. At the same time, they are also
systematically discouraged from utilising their individually available resources of power.
Attempts to extensively draw on the latter would at best be ignored within an
organization built on strong 			
and/or	regulation. More realistically, an
individual frequently questioning the structural order of the organization and insisting on
using his individual resources of power to co-ordinate expectations and interaction with
other individuals, would be seen as a person who is useless or even dangerous with
regard to the organization’s identity and stability. In contrast, under conditions of a low
level of impersonal regulation the same behaviour may well appear as an acceptable - if
not essential - means of co-ordinating activities within the organization. Where few
generalised norms and standards of behaviour exist, individuals almost inevitably have to
draw on individually attributable resources of power where - which is a likely case -

		 cannot be produced swiftly and in sufficient quantity. If they refused to do
so, a serious lack of co-ordination of individuals’ behaviour would be the unavoidable
consequence and the organization as such would sooner or later cease to exist.
Against the background of this argument, two ideal-types of organizational
regimes emerge:
Strongly regulated organizations where power primarily exists in the form of abstract
rules and procedures: This form of power (i.e. impersonal power) highly conducive to
the production of 			
		 and 			 within the organization. Individual
social actors trust each other because the institutional inventory of the organization as
well as the external environment in which it is embedded provides a reliable framework
for individuals’ expectations and interaction. In these organizations, a latent threat of
collectively legitimised sanctions is always present but is rarely made explicit or even
mobilised.19
More flexible organizations where much depends on individuals’ idiosyncratic interests
and the situational circumstances in which they make their decisions: In these
organizations, individuals develop trust in their relationships primarily on the basis of
inter-personal contacts. These play a vital role in co-ordinating expectations and
interaction between the members of the organization. But as developing trust in the form
of 
		 requires considerable efforts on the part of the individual actors and
may, even when these efforts are made, still seem quite risky, organizational actors will
often find it preferable or even unavoidable to draw on their resources of 

to achieve a sufficient level of co-ordination of activities within the organization.
These ideal-typical reconstructions of organizational regimes mark the two ends of the
scale whereas empirical cases can be expected to be located more at medium positions.
			, in particular, is a form of trust which is rooted in anthropological conditions
of human behaviour and/or the cultural basis of the business system in which the
organization’s identity is embedded. Irrespective of whether a highly or a weakly
institutionally regulated organization is concerned, none of these is likely to exist without
any 			. At the same time, impersonal forms of power and trust have lost part of
their impact on individuals’ behaviour in the past three decades or so. Contemporary
organizations, in other words, tend to move away from the traditional model of strong
and bureaucratic regulation and foster flexibility as well as more decentralised processes
of decision making. These developments are directly connected to the rediscovery of

 relationships and - in particular - 
 trust in the post-bureaucratic
organization (Grey and Garsten 2001). Thus, it can be concluded that 			 plays a
stabilising role in weakly regulated organizations while even in strongly regulated
organizations it has a decreasing potential to completely absorb individual actors’ agency.20
4 Conclusions
The analysis of trust and power as two central mechanisms of co-ordinating relationships
between individual social actors within an organizational context leads to the conclusion
that - depending on the forms of trust and power and their specific combination - two
distinct patterns of organizational control can be reconstructed. In strongly regulated
organizations impersonal forms of trust and power tend to link into each other in such
way that powerful intra-organizational and environmental structures breed trust between
individual actors in a highly efficient manner. In a weakly regulated organization, by
contrast, individual efforts to establish co-operation between relevant actors in the
organization become more important. In this case, individuals often see trust and power
as two different mechanisms to draw on when interacting with one another. Often, power
is then preferred since trust may well promise many advantages for a relationship but is
also quite awkward to build without strong impersonal safeguards.
The central aim of this chapter was to present a conceptual approach to analysing
different regimes of organizational control. The argument presented above is thus based
on analytical conceptualizations rather than empirically existing cases. The latter, of
course, greatly vary over history and different cultural backgrounds. Nonetheless,
however, in order to gain a deeper understanding of how organizations function and what
strategies might be useful when strategic interventions are considered, the conceptual
differentiation of the two suggested modes of organizational governance may be helpful
as an analytical framework. In a neo-realistic view (Layder 1997; Reed 2001), these
ideal-typical patterns of control might be understood as ‘generative mechanisms’ which
do not determine the ways of (re-)producing and transforming social relationships within
organizations. But they certainly do provide indispensable channels and viable
configurations of co-ordinated interaction between individuals pursuing their interests in
the context of organizational arrangements.21
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